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SENATOR:

ATTACHED IS THE BRIEFING INFO. FOR THE  
PRC ON SOMQLIA ON MONDAY MORNING 9:00 A.M  
WHITE HOUSE.

- 1) agenda
- 2) discussion paper
- 3) Dept. position.

**ADVANCE COPY**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~


June 12, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
The U.S. Representative to the UN  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Agenda for PRC Meeting (U)

Attached is the agenda for the PRC Meeting on Somalia which is scheduled for June 16 at 9:00 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. (C)

  
Christine Dodson  
Staff Secretary

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~~Review on June 12, 1981~~

Received in S/S-I  
6/12 at 2:50 p.m.

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AGENDA FOR PRC MEETING  
ON SOMALIA  
JUNE 16, 1980

- I. Update on latest developments and outlook (State).
- II. Access agreement negotiations -- current policy questions:
  - A. Tactics for next round in negotiations.
  - B. Elements of a US package:
    - 1. US assistance (future additions);
    - 2. Third country assistance;
    - 3. Regular consultations (political/military);
    - 4. Symbolic gestures to Siad.
    - 5. Security assurances.
- III. Longer term policy implications of a US presence in Somalia:
  - A. Projected developments over next six months;
  - B. Major contingencies;
  - C. Implications for US

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: US-Somali Access Negotiations

Attached is a discussion paper on US-Somali access negotiations for the June 16 Presidential Review Committee meeting.

Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Discussion Paper.

Drafted:AF/E:LHydle:cj  
6/12/80:X23355

Clearances: AF:LWalker  
PM: JEdgar  
S/P:EMorton

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RDS, 6/12/00



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-- any arms we provide him must be used only for the defense of internationally-recognized Somali territory, which does not include the Ogaden;

-- our concern for Somalia's security does not extend to the case of an attack provoked by Somalia's own activities in the Ogaden;

-- Somalia should try to improve its relations with Djibouti (which is dominated by ethnic Somalis) and Kenya (which has a substantial ethnic Somali population);

-- any increase in the level of fighting in the Ogaden, or the use of regular Somali army forces then, could jeopardize our new relationship.

The Somalis have raised various problems with our proposal. They have emphasized the priority of their need for air defense, which in itself would cost far more than our FMS offer. They have expressed dissatisfaction with our security assurances, without offering specific alternatives. They have suggested that there is a relationship between the quality of security assurances and the amount of security assistance required. They have asked us to use our influence with allies and friends to obtain military and economic assistance. Increasingly explicitly, Siad has asked to be invited to Washington. They have expressed only minor objections to the text of the draft access agreement we have presented to them, but have objected that addressing the access agreement alone is unfair because it focusses only on what we want. Underlying the obscure and somewhat contradictory Somali bargaining tactics is Siad's need to be able to present to his power base--the leadership of the armed forces--a package which indicates that the Americans are with Somalia, as a counterbalance to Soviet patronage of Ethiopia.

Since the negotiations began, the level of fighting in the Ogaden, and the direct involvement of the regular Somali army, has periodically increased. The Ethiopians have bombed various Somali military and civilian targets. The flow of refugees from the Ogaden area continues, and today there are about 1 1/4 million refugees in and out of camps in Somalia. The Ethiopian government has strongly criticized the US policy of access to the Persian Gulf, and has in particular objected to the new US-Somali arrangement and the possibility that the US might be present in Berbera. We have reassured the Ethiopians that our new relationship with Somalia is not directed against Ethiopia, but the Ethiopians say that this relationship will inevitably

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Presidential Review Committee Meeting on Somalia  
June 16, 1980  
Discussion Paper

Introduction

This paper, reflecting a June 11 discussion by the Interdepartmental Group on Africa, examines issues which should be considered as we prepare for the next round of negotiations for an agreement with Somalia for access to its facilities:

-- Our negotiating strategy with Siad to complete the access we are seeking, and

-- the implications of a US-Somali security relationship for possible US military involvement in the Ethio-Somali conflict.

These negotiations, along with similar negotiations with Oman and Kenya, are intended to obtain access to facilities in the region in support of the US military presence in the Persian Gulf. In the case of Somalia, our negotiating position has reflected the additional objective of continuing to dissociate the US from the Ogaden issue, in an effort to avoid military involvement and possible super-power confrontation there.

The negotiations with Oman and Kenya have been concluded and we have signed agreements. However, the negotiations with Somalia are at an impasse and our Ambassador is here to seek new instructions.

In Somalia, we are seeking increased and regular access to facilities in Berbera and Mogadishu port and airfield, and we are prepared to fund appropriate improvements to these facilities if assured access to them. In return we have offered the Somalis, in each of fiscal years 1980 and 1981, \$40 million in FMS credit on soft terms, \$5 million grant ESF, and \$300,000 IMET. In addition, we have sent a survey team to examine Somalia's military needs (the report is completed but has not yet been presented to the Somalis), have expressed our willingness to consult with the Saudis on other items for Somalia, and have offered to give expressions of interest in Somali security. We have nevertheless dissociated ourselves from Somali irredentist policies toward Ethiopia and elsewhere by telling Siad:

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embolden the Somalis to increase their attacks on the Ogaden. We have indications that the Ethiopians may be planning to attack Somalia, though the timing, nature and purpose of such an attack, and the nature of Soviet and Cuban participation cannot yet be determined. The Somalis have already asked us to warn the Ethiopians against any such attack.

The Interdepartmental Group believes that in view of the negotiating history since we first presented our offer to Siad, we cannot reach an agreement with Siad on the basis of our present position. Something new and different is needed. On the other hand, the group agreed that it is not possible substantially to increase our material support of Somalia over the next two years. By the same token, given our constitutional limits and our continued desire to stay out of the Ogaden conflict, it is not possible substantially to enhance the character of our security assurances to Siad. The Group therefore agreed that our position should be reexamined with a view toward providing new negotiating instructions for our Ambassador. A new offer would be prepared and cleared through the regular NSC system, and could include some or all of the following:

(1) consideration of discussing additional FMS, ESF, IMET, and Development Assistance funds for Somalia in fiscal years following FY 1981.

(2) use of our influence to obtain additional military and economic assistance for Somalia from Western and friendly Arab countries (with appropriate Ogaden caveats on third country arms transfers), and oil supplies for Somalia if Iraq carries out its threat to cut them off.

(3) restated, possibly public expressions of our concern for Somalia's security (which would, however, have to contain appropriate references to our constitutional processes and at least implicit Ogaden caveats).

(4) regular high-level political and military consultations such as those which we have with the Philippines.

(5) gestures to Siad personally--a Presidential letter stating our negotiating position, which Ambassador Petterson could present at an appropriate moment in the negotiations, or an invitation to visit Washington, which could be a reward for the successful completion of the negotiations.

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### Our Negotiating Strategy with Siad

If we believe we should try to persuade Siad that the relationship we have proposed will meet his needs, and after we have prepared our new negotiating position including some combination of the elements described above, our negotiating strategy with Siad should be driven by our immediate need to get a signed access agreement and military construction plan which will enable us to use their facilities with minimum unpredictability and military, economic and political cost.

The Group felt that while Siad is an inveterate haggler, there are pressures on him to move toward an early agreement with the US. He knows that the agreements with Oman and Kenya are complete and that the chances for obtaining Congressional approval for the US-Somali relationship are better if it is folded into an overall access package. He is concerned above the Ethiopian threat, and believes he needs a superpower to fight a superpower. He has few alternative partners--most Arabs are not backing him wholeheartedly because of his good relationship with Egypt, and none can match even the qualified security assurances we are offering.

While one could imagine an infinite number of tactical negotiating variants, for discussion purposes we examine two models:

#### 1. Seek an early access agreement while putting off talks on other aspects.

-- review the current state of our negotiations.

-- review US progress in reaching access agreements with Oman and Kenya. Explain our Congressional situation and the need to obtain an early access agreement and begin related military construction. Indicate we would like to set a firm early date for advancing these negotiations so we could schedule the necessary participation of US military assistance experts. Seek Somali comments on our earlier draft.

-- be prepared to respond to the Somali request for security assurances, essentially by restating the formulation approved by the SCC and given to Siad by Bartholomew in February and offering to coordinate on a public announcement of US interest in Somali security (including at least an implicit Ogaden hedge).



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-- seek to avoid new discussion of the assistance question before an access agreement is reached, while recognizing that the Somalis will continue to press us. Present the report of the military survey team during or soon after the negotiations (while recognizing that the report will whet Somali appetites and place the US on record as concurring in some of their military needs) and indicate what we will do on security assistance, particularly air defense, and third country transfers.

-- reiterate as appropriate our Ogaden caveats on security assurances and arms transfers.

The advantage of this approach, if it works, is that it quickly gets us access and permits us to get on with improvement of the facilities. The disadvantage is that it leaves substantial ambiguity in our relationship, and subjects us to constant new demands and problems, with the increasingly valuable facilities at Berbera and elsewhere as de facto hostage. Most importantly, this approach does not give Siad the overall relationship he needs. Most members of the Interdepartmental Group felt it has a low prospect of success. However, some felt that this negotiating approach should be tried, at least initially, as it reduces the chance for Siad to link other demands to the access agreement.

## 2. Full negotiations on all aspects of relationship.

Eventually, confirm in an Aide Memoire if this were felt necessary to give Siad the sense of a satisfactory overall relationship with us. This approach, favored by most members of the Interdepartmental Group, as the one with the better chance of success, would recognize the fact that we are really negotiating with Siad, whose prestige and political future rest on his ability to demonstrate to his domestic constituency--the leadership of the armed forces--that he personally has arranged a special relationship with the US. From our point of view this approach has the additional advantage of clarifying the whole relationship and limiting ambiguity in our future dealings with Somalia. The disadvantage is that it subjects us to further camel-trading and searches for advantage on individual issues, which might delay the conclusion of an access agreement by comparison with the first approach.

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Implications of a US-Somali Security Relationship for  
Possible US Military Involvement in the Ethio-Somali Con-  
flict

As we proceed to implement this agreement with Siad, we will face certain problems inherent to any close relationship with an irredentist power.

As we grow closer to Somalia and improve the facilities at Berbera, we will find ourselves increasingly subjected to political pressure by the Somalis in proportion to our investment of time, money and men. We have seen this phenomenon before in both Morocco and Ethiopia under the Emperor. Over either the long or the short term, should Somali activities in the Ogaden provoke significant Ethiopian reprisals in Somalia we would surely be faced with a Siad demand for support.

Our diplomatic options in response to such a Somali request would vary as the nature of an Ethiopian attack unfolded - a key element would be whether or not there was provable Cuban or Soviet military involvement.

In view of our close relationship with Somalia and our often voiced interest in a political and non-violent solution in the Ogaden we would want to consider diplomatic initiatives in the event of an invasion. Our initial steps would include approaches to Ethiopia and interested countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and the moderate Arabs in an effort to persuade the Ethiopians that they ran high risks of forcing superpower confrontations if they persisted with their activities. We would also urge the Somalis to announce publicly their support for a negotiated and peaceful settlement of the Ogaden question. The Cubans and Soviets could be approached and urged to persuade the Ethiopians to avoid the risk of an invasion and in any case to avoid involving themselves in such Ethiopian activity.

In the event our diplomatic activities were unsuccessful (and in the face of a considered Ethiopian decision to invade Somalia and/or establish a puppet Somali government it is difficult to be optimistic about our prospects) we would have to consider military options. It seems to us that there are really only four general approaches:

1. Avoid US military involvement of any kind. This would probably forestall a superpower confrontation which, given Soviet assets in Ethiopia and South Yemen, would be difficult to win without widening and escalating the war. It would increase the risk that the Ethiopians would succeed.

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2. Deployment of a task force into the immediate area of the Horn as part of an effort to deter an Ethiopian attack or to induce a halt. This contains elements of a bluff should Soviet forces deploy to challenge us or should the Ethiopians pursue their attack undeterred. We would then have to consider whether we would be prepared to provide direct US military air cover for Somali forces and to risk engagement with the Ethiopians. This option would involve the War Powers Act.

3. Direct US military support for Somalia. Politically, this would require us either to shift from the US position that we would not consider an Ethiopian attack against Somalia which had been precipitated by Somali action in the Ogaden as covered by the assurances we have offered in our discussions with the Somalis on facilities, or to decide that, since the level of Somali activity has remained roughly constant since our agreement in principle in February, the Ethiopian attack should be regarded as not precipitated by Somali actions. This option would also involve the War Powers Act.

4. Try to stimulate action by a surrogate such as the Egyptians which we could support in one fashion or another.

None of these options are attractive. On the one hand a policy which failed to provide the Somalis with additional defensive means to resist Ethiopian military action would be politically costly for us, specifically, in

- a perceived backdown in the face of the Soviet/Cuban presence in Ethiopia;

- a failure to demonstrate to Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arabs our concern for their security fears in the Arabian Peninsula; and

- an international perception of weakening US firmness and resolve in the face of Soviet backed Ethiopian military activity.

On the other hand additional military support of Siad can only lead to a further US military and political embroilment in the dubious affairs of the Ogaden.

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In short, we might find that we can only maintain our Somali policy by providing even greater military assets to Siad which could lead to our direct involvement in the Horn; or that we could only disengage from such a military relationship by paying a political price which was unacceptable to our interests elsewhere in the region or the world.

We have been negotiating with Siad on the basis that we could isolate ourselves and our relationship with Somalia from the Ogaden conflict by insisting on constraints on Somali activities there. The dynamics of politics and war in the Horn are such that Siad cannot and will not abjure some kind of involvement in the Ogaden. Indeed he will almost surely bend every effort to associate us with his policy even tangentially (i.e., third country arms transfers). The Ethiopians are under increasing pressure to retaliate for this activity. This retaliation could eventually place Siad in a difficult military situation, since the Ethiopians currently, and for the foreseeable future, will possess materiel superiority in the Ogaden region. We might face the possibility of actual hostilities around our Berbera facility. We might equally face a call from Siad for help in extracting himself from an SNA debacle inside the Ogaden. In any event, we must certainly accept that we are running a high risk of an eventual Siad call for support which will confront us with the dilemma set out above. However, to some degree we might well face this dilemma whether we have a security relationship or not. Whatever the Somali provocation, the US could not ignore an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and would have to consider seriously the options listed above, even in the absence of a formal security relationship.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

June 13, 1980

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TO : The Secretary

FROM : S/P - Anthony Lake *TL*  
PM - Reginald Bartholomew *RB*

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on Somalia: Monday, June 16

The President has decided to seek to gain US access to Somali military facilities as an important part of building a Southwest Asian security framework. There is general agreement that it would be useful to have such access. Opinions differ with respect to the level of priority we should attach to the Somali facilities.

The basic question is: how much are we prepared to pay for Somali access? Further, to what degree will the agreement reached be on our terms as contrasted with Siad's? Our interests differ.

-- It is clear that Siad views the base access arrangement as a way of strengthening his domestic position and obtaining a US cover for Somalia in pursuing its historic objective of gaining the Ogaden.

-- We, for our part, seek the bases for our own security objectives. We hope to gain enough influence with Siad to persuade him to limit his direct military involvement in the Ogaden, reducing the risk of major Ethiopian military action directly against Somalia which might involve us. This would allow us the access at the least risk of involvement in an Ethio-Somali war.

The immediate, operational question is whether we should proceed to raise our offer to Siad in ways that will successfully gain us Somali base access. The underlying strategic question is whether, having gained a US-Somali base access agreement, we will be faced with events, such as an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, that will confront us with the dilemma of either:

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~~GDS 6/13/86 (Lake, A.)~~



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-- supporting Somalia and being drawn into a conflict due to Somali action in the Ogaden (in contravention of international law and past US policy pronouncements), or

-- abandoning an implicit commitment to Somalia, with all of the adverse international, regional, and domestic implications such a humiliation would entail.

#### Reasons for Proceeding

1. Somali access important to security framework for Southwest Asia.
2. Egyptians, Saudis, and others in immediate region will welcome increased US presence. They would be deeply concerned if we appeared to abandon this negotiation.
3. In worst-case scenario, strategic value accrues to bases if need to deter or defend against Ethiopian/Cuban or Ethiopian/Cuban/Soviet attack on Somalia.
4. Demonstrates US constancy and the ability to successfully achieve a major security objective; conversely, to be seen as backing away would have an important negative impact at home and abroad.
5. Domestically in U.S., would increase confidence that US proceeding to develop security framework for Southwest Asia, as promised.

#### Reasons Against Proceeding on Current or Enhanced Terms

1. Siad has increased activity in Ogaden during last few months. In consequence, danger of Ethiopian attack on Somalia has grown.
2. Siad clearly seeking base agreement with US in order to gain a US cover (actual, and perceived) in its attempt to achieve its ambitions in the Ogaden.
3. Also clear that our influence with Siad on the Ogaden is limited at best. For six months we have stressed the importance of restraint in the Ogaden, and Siad has ignored our concerns.
4. US support for Somalia, implicit in base access agreement, and perhaps made more explicit as condition of gaining access, could well confront us with terrible choice of backing Somalia in a conflict or abandoning a new "friend". This dilemma exists to some degree in any event. We could not ignore a major Ethiopian thrust into Somalia whether we had an explicit security relationship or not.

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5. Unclear US willing to provide resources sufficient to pay price that Siad will demand for base access in future years.

Options

Both of us believe we do not have the option of simply abandoning the negotiations for the reasons listed above. We believe we have three basic options:

Option 1: Proceed with the negotiations along the lines recommended by the IG. Include additional sweeteners such as increased funding, US influence with third parties for support, public expressions of US concern for Somali security, personal gestures of friendship to Siad, and high-level political and military consultations with the Somalis.

Option 2: Proceed with Stringent Conditions by offering Siad additional aid for an air defense package well above the current \$40 million offer, while simultaneously making it clear to Siad that our offer is dependent on withdrawal of regular Somali forces from the Ogaden. If Siad balks, or less likely, rejects these conditions, he would then bear the onus for any delay or breakdown in the negotiations. If he accepted we could gain access while addressing the Ogaden issue in a way which limits our risks and makes clear to Siad our intention to use our military assistance as a lever on his behavior in the Ogaden.

Option 3: Leave our current offers on the table, in the expectation that Siad will break off negotiations by turning us down. (It would be terribly damaging simply to abandon the offer.)

There is disagreement regarding the appropriateness of discussing the broader implications of Somali base access in this PRC or in an SCC context. But it is logical to discuss the basic questions raised by pursuing the negotiations under current circumstances before considering the tactics for pursuing the negotiations. Key basic questions include the likelihood of an Ethiopian attack if Siad's current activities continue and we gain access; the military value of the access in light of successful arrangements with Kenya and Oman; and whether we can find a way of having and eating our cake: i.e., getting access to Berbera and persuading Siad to cool it in the Ogaden. I do not believe it is serving him well to offer the President tactical recommendations on the base access negotiations, without working through the larger issues. Simply suggesting the dangers of the course we are pursuing is insufficient and even contradictory.

We suggest that you begin with the first agenda item on the package we are offering Siad, but try quickly to move discussion to the broader strategic issues and toward the option of your choice.

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Recommendation

We believe Option 2 best positions us to gain access on terms favorable to us rather than Siad. Moving forward on his terms presents real dangers not worth the undoubted benefits. But we should pursue access, if we can, in a way consistent with our interests.

cc: P - Mr. Newsom  
AF - Mr. Moose

Drafted: S/P:EMorton:  
x21494

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